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The views expressed in this research paper are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US 
Government, Department of Defense, US Southern Command or Florida 
International University.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Brazilians greeted the long-awaited decision of making Rio 
de Janeiro the host of the 2016 Olympic Games with 
tremendous exhilaration.  Although Rio’s fantastic natural 
beauty certainly added to its attraction in hosting the games, 
its alarming rates of urban crime and violence largely 
associated with drug trafficking immediately triggered 
worldwide criticism, and put at issue its ability to guarantee 
the security for the games.  Brazilians have been vying for a 
position as an emerging global economy and understand the 
importance of the Games for international prestige.  This 
makes the stakes very high when hosting the Olympic 
Games in the wake of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, which 
will also be held in Brazil.  
 
This paper explores these criticisms and assesses Rio’s 
ability to prepare for this important event.  The paper further 
explores the consensus that Brazilians will be more equipped 
to address actions taken by organized crime capable of 
affecting the Olympic Games than to face a terrorist attack.  
Brazil – and Rio – does not figure in the “terrorism map” as 
a region particularly linked to terrorism.  Aside from 
uncorroborated suspicions of activities by terrorist 
organizations on the Tri-Border region (Argentina, Brazil, 
and Paraguay), Brazil does not elicit many concerns 
regarding terrorism.
1
  Yet, there is no way to guarantee that 
terrorist organizations will not try to make use of the 2016 
Rio Olympic Games to advance their agenda.  This being in 
mind, Rio and Brazil in general face a long road ahead to 
prepare, prevent, protect and respond to a possible terrorist 
attack during the 2016 Olympics. It is clear that prevention 
and preparation towards potential threats to the Games must 
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 U.S. Department of State has confirmed that this area may have been 
used to transport weapons and conduct financial affairs in the past.  This 
type of activity has been made more difficult with the fortification of 
border controls in more recent times. 
2 
 
necessarily include cooperation and exchange of best 
practices with other countries. 
3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Widespread festivities ensued on October 2, 2009, after the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) gathered in 
Denmark, Copenhagen, and selected Rio de Janeiro to host 
the 2016 XXXI Olympiad.  Brazilians – including then 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – exploded in emotion 
and excitement with the long-awaited decision.
2
  
Nevertheless, just a few weeks after the first year-long 
anniversary of that memorable decision, the ability of Rio to 
hold the Olympic Games seemed to be seriously challenged.  
In November 2010, in a series of widespread attacks 
throughout Rio, dozens of motor vehicles were burned by 
criminals (reportedly, following the orders of notorious 
jailed drug dealers), as a reaction to the policy of community 
police, or more specifically, Pacification Police Units (UPP).  
These attacks also followed an incident in August of 2010, 
where a four-star hotel experienced a hostage standoff in the 
vicinity of the future site of the 2016 Olympics.
3
  Police 
officers had attempted to apprehend a convoy of gang 
members who were returning from a late night party and 
travelling from one favela (or slum) to another.  Several 
officers were hurt and one gang member killed in the 
exchanges of gunfire that led up to the hostage situation, but 
the 5 guests and approximately 30 hotel employees taken 
captive were ultimately released without severe harm.  Yet, 
as part of a continuing strategy of favela occupation, and in 
response to these events, the government acted decisively to 
occupy some favelas in the southern zone of Rio that had 
been for a long time under the control of criminals, or known 
to host factions of organized crime.  With the help of the 
Brazilian Navy, armored cars, and the Brazilian Army, Rio 
military and civilian police invaded these slums, arrested 
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several gang members who had not yet fled, and confiscated 
hundreds of weapons and large quantities of drugs.
4
 
 
In the end, the police action was positive and certainly 
restricted criminal control in large portions of the city.  
However, the crisis produced graphic scenes via global news 
media of urban battle only found in situations of war and 
insurgency, and heightened concerns for the 2016 Olympic 
Games’ security.  Brazilian authorities were quick to brush 
away these concerns.  Carlos Arthur Nuzman, President of 
Brazilian Olympic Committee (COB), stressed officially that 
the situation had proven not only the commitment and 
resolve of Brazilian authorities to face the drug related crime 
in Rio, but also –  underscoring the public support by the 
general population for the police action – that the State was 
on the right track.  Finally, he explained that Rio had already 
demonstrated its capacity to provide security to major 
sporting events – during the 2007 Pan American Games, for 
example – and that the security plan for the 2016 Olympic 
Games had been approved by the International Olympic 
Committee.
5
  Rio de Janeiro mayor Eduardo Paes also stated 
that the crisis offered a demonstration of the State’s 
commitment to address the crime problem in Rio, and 
reassured that “in seven years, the violent situation in Rio 
will be completely different.”6 
 
Although it is now five years prior to the 2016 Olympic 
Games, this paper addresses these questions with the 
intention of outlining the security concerns related to the Rio 
event, and recommends some preventive measures.  With the 
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 These events received daily coverage between November 21 and 
December 15, 2001 in most Brazilian newspapers, including: O Globo, O 
Estado de Sao Paulo, and  Folha de Sao Paulo as well as by CNN 
World. 
5
 http://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticias/nuzman-promete-
olimpiada-no-rio-com-total-seguranca-20101127.html. 
6
http://esporte.ig.com.br/mais/2009/10/19/prefeito+do+rio+garante+segu
ranca+da+olimpiada+de+2016+8879910.html. 
5 
 
2012 and 2014 Soccer World Cups – to take place in London 
and Brazil, respectively – in between, the paper looks at 
security circumstances unique to the Olympic Games in 
general and considers these circumstances in light of specific 
variables suggested by Rio de Janeiro.  It adopts a familiar 
methodological framework used to analyze security 
situations, beginning with an analysis of possible threats and 
contrasting it with the measures planned by the State to face 
those threats.  It also compares security challenges peculiar 
to past major sporting events as a means to identify lessons 
learned that may eventually be useful to Brazil. 
 
WHAT SECURITY CONCERNS US?  
 
Although the Rio 2010 security crises were very graphic and 
alarming, they are not necessarily a harbinger of the threats 
and the related ability of State to provide security during the 
Olympic Games.  From the international standpoint, the 
preoccupation instigated by the 2010 security crises was 
more because they apparently put into question the capability 
of different Brazilian security forces to provide safety.  
However, they had little correlation to the threat eventually 
represented by those criminals to the Olympic Games, due to 
the measures that have been and will be taken prior to the 
Games.  Moreover, the crises and their resolutions reveal 
very little about the major security concerns that revolve 
around potential terrorist threats.  This is a legitimate 
concern not only because of the history of terrorist attacks 
during the Olympic Games, but also because this opportunity 
offers terrorists the visibility and ability to strike at multiple 
nations simultaneously. 
 
There are therefore two distinct levels of threats that must be 
considered when analyzing security prospects for the 2016 
Olympic Games:  the first is represented by the current 
domestic threats associated with crime and local violence 
that have been haunting Rio for many decades vis-à-vis the 
ability of the State to reduce and control exposure of this 
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threat to the sporting events, the athletes, and the public; and 
the second is represented by the prospects of a terrorist 
attack during the Games, when the target will not necessarily 
be Brazil, but the Games themselves, and/or specific country 
delegations.  To face the first level of threat, Rio’s 
authorities have considerable experience and have been 
implementing a robust set of measures that should result in 
an improved security environment by 2016.  
 
The second level, however, has a much more prominent 
international dimension and requires a strategic approach.  
On the one hand, Brazil does not figure among the usual 
targets of current terrorist organizations, the most notorious 
being those espousing Islamic extremism.  Indeed, Brazil has 
thus far neither been threatened with nor been the target of 
terrorist activity, which lends some assurance to the 
organizers of the 2016 Olympics.  On the other hand, this 
reality may exactly suggest to terrorists that Rio might 
therefore act as an ideal operational environment for the 
perpetration of terrorist attacks.  Bearing this scenario in 
mind, Brazilian police forces are not geared towards this 
type of threat and its prevention, presenting a dilemma to 
those who responsible for the security of the 2016 Rio 
Olympic Games.  Overall, security in the face of possible 
threats from uncertain sources will require careful 
preparedness and extraordinary cooperation among security 
institutions and countries involved.  
 
THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC CRIME – 
ORGANIZED OR NOT – TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
 
Although Rio’s rampant crime rates raise security concerns 
related to the organization of a mega-sporting event at the 
magnitude of the Olympic Games, the preparedness to face 
them is completely different from the threat represented by 
terrorism.  First of all, it is important to acknowledge the 
seriousness of the crime problem in Rio, previously raised 
before the IOC during the selection process.  Yet the IOC 
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also noticed important progress made by Rio’s government 
in its efforts to reduce crime, achieved primarily through the 
creation of Community Policing Programs.  The IOC 
observed, for example that the city's homicide rate had 
dropped to 33 per 100,000 people in 2009, down from 39 per 
100,000 the year before.  Confident in the success of these 
programs, Rio’s authorities expect the rate to continue falling 
despite a homicide spike from April through June.  These are 
nevertheless much higher rates than other big cities, and in 
particular, other former Olympic competitors.  For example, 
Chicago had 16 homicides per 100,000 in 2007 and 18 in 
2008.  Madrid presented 2 homicides per 100,000 for 2007 
and 2008, whereas Tokyo had only 1 per 100,000 in both 
years.
7
 
 
Beyond crime rates, however, Rio also attracts attention 
because of the visibility of its crime, caused by Rio’s 
geography and distribution of slums clustered amongst its 
many mountains.
8
  Due to these characteristics, criminals 
have turned some of these favelas into their kingdoms, in 
which they impose power over dwellers and control drug 
traffic; and police enforcement is difficult unless a 
permanent presence is established (which is the rationale 
behind the UPPs).  In addition, criminal gangs often engage 
in highly visible gun battles over the control of “drug sales 
points.” This tendency, to the extent that it is unchecked, has 
reduced security among Rio’s residents and undermined the 
legitimacy of the State.  Highly visible police operations to 
curb the action of these criminals are inherently traumatic, 
especially when it becomes necessary to resort to military 
support to retake control of regions that again fall under the 
control of criminals.  The link that exists between organized 
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 For detailed statistics on Rio de Janeiro’s crime rates, see,  Secretaria de 
Estado de Segurança, Estatísticas de Segurança Pública do Rio de 
Janeiro,  http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=221. 
8
 Rio has approximately 250 favelas, with a growing population of 
around 1.5 million. According to Brazilian authorities, about half of the 
favelas are believed to be under the influence or control of drug gangs.  
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and drug-related crime dominated by gangs and common 
crime in Rio is undeniable, and by means of one example, 
was made perceivable by the November 2010 occupation of 
a favela area known as the Alemão Complex; after having 
highly visible police and military operations, car robberies in 
Rio’s wealthier Southern Zone came down 20 percent when 
compared to previous months. 
 
Observing the situation from the Brazilian State perspective, 
it is clear that the UPP policy represents the most serious 
government attempt to tackle the problem and re-establish 
State control over many of these critical areas.
9
  According 
to Rio’s Secretary for Public Security, José Mariano 
Beltrame, the criminal attacks unleashed in Rio during 
October and November of 2010 were manifestations of 
organized crime against the success of the UPPs.  Ironically, 
however, these criminal attacks then contributed to the 
creation of momentum as well as public justification for the 
State to act decisively to both curb the crisis and establish 
control over the Alemão Complex.  Moreover, in the face of 
the stakes represented by the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 
Olympics, this level of action was indeed warranted by 
Brazilian authorities.  
 
In addition to the specific UPP program mentioned above, 
the overall police presence in the southern zone of Rio has 
also been bolstered, with additional police placed on the 
beaches and within neighborhoods during periods with 
                                                 
9
 Pacification Police Units (UPPs) were created by Rio’s Secretariat for 
Public Safety upon the principle of “communitarian police,” including 
the notion of partnership with the population and other public safety 
institutions.  Rio’s original investment plan for these units earmarked 
US$ 8 million and predicted a contingent of 60,000 officers by 2016.  
Official expectation is that by getting closer to the population and 
promoting social policies inside communities, police will reestablish 
control “over areas that for decades were occupied by narcotraffic and 
recently, also by militias.”  UPP Reporter, 9 January 2011, 
http://www.upprj.com/en/?page_id=445.  
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increased potential for criminal activity.  During 2010, the 
Rio police force was increased by 2,000 officers, and an 
increase of 7,000 more is slated for 2011, with an overall 
goal of an increase from roughly 40,000 to 60,000 officers.  
The Military Police Battalion for Special Operations (BOPE) 
is also slated to increase by 50 percent before 2016.
10
  Given 
the continuity in political leadership and Brazil’s improving 
economic situation, this trend is likely to continue.   
 
Methodologically, the planning for the security of the 
Olympic Games may be conceived around a matrix based 
upon two main components: one defined by a tremendous 
influx of individuals to the city (over 10,500 athletes and 
country-delegations, tourists, journalists, local public, etc), 
and another defined by events and locations (the opening 
ceremony, sporting events, competition areas, parking lots, 
the Olympic Village, city hotels, airports, the transportation 
system, touristic spots and more.  As can be seen in the map 
below, Rio’s Olympic Games will happen in four distinct 
zones, defined by their compatibility with the Games’ 
requirements, as well as by different socio-economic 
characteristics.
11
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 See http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2010/12/31/esforcos-na-area-de-
seguranca-ja-direcionam-rio-para-as-olimpiada-de-2016-923396400.asp.  
11
 http://www.economist.com/node/14587915.  
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RIO:  PLANNED OLYMPIC ZONES 
Source: http://www.economist.com/node/14587915. 
 
The zones and the activities in each are:  
 
 Barra area will be the “heart” of the Games. It will 
accommodate the Olympic Village and the media 
village. 
 Copacabana neighborhood will host outdoor sports 
in temporary venues. 
 Maracanã Stadium will host the Opening and Closing 
Ceremonies. 
 Deodoro area will be used for other competitions. 
 
The map below denotes the locations of favelas that have 
been the targets of recent operations to clear out drug 
trafficking (Alemão Complex, Jacarezinho, Vila Cruzeiro, 
and Rocinha).
12
  Rocinha is one of the largest favelas in Rio 
and features the greatest development towards being an 
urbanized neighborhood.  It has its own businesses and a 
residents’ association with municipal functions.  The 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11852588.  
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remaining favelas in the southern zone are occupied by 
UPPs, which maintain vigilance against drug trafficking.  
  
RIO:  MAIN FAVELAS  
Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11852588. 
 
Infrastructure changes are scheduled to route Olympics 
traffic through a new metro under or around Rocinha.  It 
would be advisable for Rio’s risk prevention team to 
establish contact with Rocinha’s residence association to 
monitor activity there – if they have not done so already – as 
it will be impossible to control every variable related to the 
favela.  Rocinha’s resident population has an interest in 
avoiding international incidents, and could be a valuable 
asset in security risk reduction.  As for the primary tourist 
destinations in the southern zone – Ipanema, Copacabana, 
Downtown, and Corcovado – the density of officers 
stationed in these areas should limit the potential risks. 
 
12 
 
For the enforcement authorities, the most sensitive groups to 
be secured are the athletes and the country-delegations; and 
the priority areas are the Olympic village and the sporting 
events areas.  But these do not represent security challenges 
much different from what the enforcement authorities are 
already familiar with.   It necessitates securing the perimeter 
and establishing security rings and check points.  The 
difference, of course, is the magnitude of the situation; yet 
this can still be managed with enough police forces, 
extensive training, and the most advanced techniques in 
threat detection. 
 
The situation gets much more complicated, however, when 
security provision is extended to areas not directly related to 
sporting events – and when athletes are not competing and 
will be touring around the city.  Criminals may very well use 
additional tourist spots, the public transportation system, 
hotels, airports, etc., and will certainly view them as 
opportunities to perpetrate robberies, harass people, or sell 
drugs.  To limit and inhibit their actions, police presence is 
essential, including the establishment of checkpoints (for 
weapons, drugs, and known criminals) at critical points of 
access to Rio’s downtown zone.  Given the narrow transit 
corridors, this may be best carried out during specific events, 
at the zone’s surrounding bottlenecks.  With the massive 
influx of people, congestion will be a problem for response 
teams, but due to Rio’s extensive experience with major 
events, this problem should not be insurmountable.  Finally, 
the occurrence of lost participants or attendees in the 
surrounding areas can be avoided if the logistics are properly 
planned for, i.e. structuring public and athlete transportation 
in combination with advisory information regarding 
excursions to be avoided. 
 
Brazilian authorities argue that they have gained credibility 
and experience by having hosted the 2007 Pan American 
Games with no incidents.  Moreover, they say that they will 
have the opportunity to streamline their security planning in 
13 
 
two additional occasions prior to the 2016 Games, as Rio 
will host both The International Military Sports Council 
(CISM)’s 5th Military World Games in July 2011, and the 
2014 FIFA World Cup (Soccer).  The problem however is in 
the magnitude of the Olympics in comparison to these 
events: Olympics will bring much more athletes, delegations 
from many more countries, and will attract much more 
tourists than these other sports events.   
 
THE SECURITY STRUCTURE 
 
Before the IOC, the Brazilian Federal Government, through 
the Ministry of Justice, assumed financial and operational 
responsibility for the security of the Olympic Games.  The 
National Public Security Secretariat (SENASP) of the 
Ministry of Justice was given the task of coordinating the 
efforts of federal, State, and city agencies related to the 
security operations of the Games, and was given a budget of 
US$3.5 billion for security improvements over the next 4 
years – as promised by Rio Governor Sergio Cabral during 
Brazil’s presentation before the IOC in Copenhagen.13  
Furthermore, the World Bank has recently pledged $485 
million in funding to address conditions in the favelas and 
public transportation needs, contingent upon specific 
improvements.
14
  With all of this funding in mind, it is now 
useful to carry out an assessment of the security resources 
Brazil has at its disposal. 
 
At the municipal level, Rio de Janeiro counts upon a 
municipal guard, which is basically a preventive police that 
has no investigative powers.  At the State level, police 
command and control is under the State Secretary for Public 
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Safety, which counts upon the Civilian Police (which has 
law enforcement authority to investigate crimes committed 
against criminal laws), as well as the Military Police (the 
State’s main enforcement organization) to maintain order.  
Whereas the Civilian Police do not wear uniforms and do not 
conduct patrols, the Military Police are a uniformed police--
considered an ancillary arm of the Brazilian Army--that 
patrols the streets.  Military Police have the authority to 
arrest suspects, but generally transfer them to the Civilian 
Police.  The State governor also has the Military Fire 
Brigade at his disposal, which, although it does not have 
police duties, acts as a critical part of the safety planning for 
events that involve large concentrations of people. 
 
At the federal level, there are three police institutions: the 
Brazilian Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, and 
the Federal Railway Police.  The Federal Police, under the 
Ministry of Justice, hold enforcement responsibilities for 
crimes against the Federal Government and its agencies, 
international drug-trafficking and terrorism, and immigration 
and border control.  The Federal Highway Police patrol 
federal highways and are responsible for maintaining order 
but not investigating crimes.  The same is true for the 
Federal Railway Police:  they patrol the federal railway 
system, but do not have a criminal investigation mandate.  
Again, these institutions may perform critical roles during 
the Games in regards to transportation systems. 
 
Moreover, as a response to the rampant crime in urban 
centers, the Brazilian government created the National 
Public Security Force in November 2004.  This is a specially 
trained and equipped body that incorporates elements from 
several police units for deployment in emergency situations.  
As it happened during the Pan American games, this force 
will likely be prepped for rapid emergency deployment prior 
to the Olympic Games; deployment itself depends upon a 
specific request by the State Governor to the Federal 
Government.  However, these multiple security capacities 
15 
 
requires proper intelligence if they are to be utilized within 
the proper circumstances.  Therefore, the following section 
sets out to describe Brazil’s existing intelligence capabilities. 
 
THE INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE 
 
Another important asset to the upcoming sporting events, 
and particularly to the Olympic Games, will be the Brazilian 
intelligence structure, especially given its historical 
orientation towards domestic concerns.  Although 
intelligence organizations have existed within Brazil’s 
government structure since 1929, its current doctrine was 
heavily influenced by the military dictatorship of 1964 to 
1985.  Widespread domestic goals and a broad concept of 
intelligence that valued any information that was important 
to the government’s decision-making led the military to 
install an intelligence network that extended throughout the 
entire administration, including the federal government and 
States.  The National Intelligence Service (SNI), whose chief 
had the status of Minister, could benefit from an 
extraordinary network that included police organizations 
centered around regional intelligence communities.  
Although the core of this system, which was extensively 
designed to sustain the authoritarian regime, was removed, 
its internal orientation remained.  On December 1999, a new 
intelligence agency was created-- the Brazilian Intelligence 
Agency, (ABIN)--finally formalizing the Brazilian 
Intelligence System.  The mandate of the Agency and the 
system, however, still leave extraordinary latitude for 
domestic intelligence incursions, even though some 
institutional checks were implemented.
15
  Nevertheless, the 
primary strengths of the ABIN are its ability to connect and 
coordinate federal level intelligence with regional level 
intelligence, as well as its utilization of regional intelligence 
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clusters, which were already successfully tested during the 
Pan American Games in 2007. 
 
In terms of specific measures, the Government of Rio has 
established an Integrated Center for Command and Control 
(CICC) at the level of the State administration and is 
finalizing training plans for the police to operate in large 
events.  In Brasília, as a result of an agreement between the 
Brazilian Ministry of Justice and the United Nations for 
Inter-regional Crime and Justice Investigation (UNICRI), the 
International Academy for Public Safety will be created.  As 
a part of police training, Rio State administration is offering 
73 Distance Learning Courses and will have another one in 
2011--open to police and firefighters--which is specifically 
designed for the World Cup and the Olympic Games.  Police 
attending these courses receive salary remuneration 
proportional to the courses they take.  The Military Police 
Battalion for Special Operations (BOPE) will also receive 
training specifically designed for these events, which will 
include the areas of counterterrorism, hostage rescue, 
countering bomb threats, and language.  Along the same 
lines, attention has been dedicated to the improvement of 
intelligence capabilities and to the exchange of police 
personnel with other countries, namely France, Spain, 
Colombia, the United States, and Italy.  And finally, in 
February 2011, a corruption scheme uncovered by the 
Federal Police led to the arrest of 30 police officers and the 
replacement of the Chief of the Civil Police.
16
  This serves as 
an indicator of the Brazilian government’s political will to 
redress with efficacy problems related to corruption. 
 
Thus, security concerns relating to the crime threat for the 
2016 Olympic Games can be measured against the policies 
and measures that have already been put in motion.  The 
institutional reforms, investment in infrastructure, and 
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additional resources committed to the provision of security 
for the Games are significant steps in deterring criminal 
activity.  Not only are these changes bolstering that goal, 
they are also changing the landscape of Rio’s security 
environment, adding the element of a “moving target,” so to 
speak.  As it becomes clearer that the Brazilian government 
is taking every measure possible to address the security 
situation from a criminal standpoint, it will also affect other 
potential threats to the Olympic Games originating from 
outside Brazil.  This is especially the case given the worst 
types of criminals present in Rio, including organized groups 
with military class armaments, like the Comando Vermelho, 
and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC).
17
 
 
TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO THE 2016 OLYMPIC 
GAMES  
 
Thanks to the extraordinary progress of telecommunications, 
the Olympic Games have become the global mass media 
event with an unmatched capacity to capture and mesmerize 
the attention of millions of viewers.  Yet due to this global 
media exposure, there are incentives in place for terrorism 
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 Comando Vermelho is a Brazilian criminal organization founded in 
1979 in the prison Cândido Mendes, on the Ilha Grande island, Rio de 
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that must not be ignored.  The Olympic Games have become 
very attractive to those interested in promoting their political 
ideas – or perhaps to demonstrate their power – in the global 
arena. 
 
Brazil is not normally associated with the perpetration or 
target of terrorism, particularly the terrorism motivated by 
ideological extremism.  It has taken steps to control the 
porousness of the Tri-border region (Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay), previously alleged to have been involved in 
terrorist activity following 9/11 but no evidence of a training 
camp or bomb-making facility has ever been produced.  That 
being said, terrorist groups may not have a particular interest 
in hitting Brazil, but they may be interested in attacking 
other participant countries, or merely in advertising their 
respective agendas, and this could make the Rio Olympic 
Games a potential target. 
 
South America has not been a stranger to terrorist acts, or 
even to terrorism perpetrated by Muslim extremism.  In 
1992, thirty people were killed in the bombing of the Israeli 
Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and in 1994 another 
bombing was leveled against the Argentine-Israeli Mutual 
Association (AMIA) – also in Buenos Aires – killing 85 
people.  Other attacks, although under different motivations, 
had happened prior to that, in the context of domestic 
ideological and political conflicts.  Colombia, for example, 
has been the target of bombings and kidnappings.  Brazil has 
also recorded some cases of terrorism – such as bombings 
and kidnappings – that were perpetrated by leftist 
organizations during the country’s military dictatorship 
(1964-1985); and its history also features the curious case of 
a failed terrorist attack perpetrated by government officials at 
odds with the country’s political opening to democracy.18 
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 On the evening of April 30, 1981, a bomb accidentally exploded 
during a concert in Rio de Janeiro (Rio Centro Pavilion) that had been 
organized to celebrate Labor Day.  The bomb exploded within a car, 
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THE RISK AND VULNERABILITIES ASSESSMENT OF 
TERRORISM TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES  
 
As previously stated, the current realities and strategic 
environment of Rio de Janeiro show that the risks of crime 
during the Olympic Games are much higher than the risks of 
a terrorist attack.  Yet, when terrorist threats are analyzed via 
a comparative perspective, the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the 
2016 games in Rio seem much higher than that for London 
in 2012.  For example, recent terror attacks in the North 
Atlantic were made possible by the failure of passport 
screening and domestic security officials to identify known 
security liabilities; such shortcomings could easily transpire 
in Brazil, particularly since it currently offers few 
extraordinary obstacles for the entry into the country that are 
comparable to those of the U.S. and Britain.
19
 
  
Furthermore, could terrorists find easy access to weapons 
and explosives in Rio?  This is the point where criminal 
activities in Rio converge with terrorist threats.  If each 
criminal organization has access to weaponry – including 
weapons with high lethal power – terrorists would not 
encounter major obstacles in obtaining the weapons 
necessary for an eventual attack.  And as crime and drug 
traffic have overwhelmingly demonstrated, Brazilian borders 
are so extensive and porous that it makes it tremendously 
difficult to effectively control the inflow of these powerful 
                                                                                                    
killing the Braziian Army Sargent Guilherme Pereira do Rosario, and 
injuring the Brazilian Army Captain Wilson Dias Machado.  
Investigation following the incident demonstrated that the bomb – which 
exploded prematurely – was part of a plot designed by extreme right 
sectors of the government to thwart Brazil’s on-going process towards 
democracy.  The intention of the perpetrators was to interrupt the concert 
and blame the extreme left for the terrorist attack.  However, the event 
ended up hastening the deterioration of the military dictatorship in Brazil 
and the return to democracy. 
19
 This underscores the importance of screening arrivals before they are 
allowed on Brazilian soil. 
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items into the country.  Neither can we discard the use of 
criminal networks to facilitate weapons and explosives 
transfers to terrorist cells.  That said, current impediments to 
the entry of terrorist “commandos,” weapons, and explosives 
can indeed be surpassed, which as a whole, could carry 
overarching negative consequences.  For example, from the 
terrorist’s perspective – and assuming we are dealing with 
ideological/religious extremists – Brazil may be perceived as 
a location that can provide valuable assets for the 
sustainment and support necessary for the preparation of an 
attack.  As the forensics of other terrorist attacks have 
demonstrated, the existence of a supporting network already 
in place is of critical importance to the attackers.
20
 
 
The other fact to be analyzed then is the Brazilian 
government forces’ ability to anticipate and prevent a 
terrorist attack.  This relies intensively upon the intelligence 
capability and, as we have seen before in this paper, Brazil 
does not have a strong history of foreign intelligence or 
counter-intelligence; conversely, the Brazilian Intelligence 
System’s domestic orientation is a liability when it comes to 
terrorism originating from abroad.  Therefore, Brazil’s 
ability to anticipate a terrorist attack will rely extensively 
upon partner intelligence organizations interested in sharing 
tactics and techniques with their Brazilian counterparts.  And 
certainly, Brazil will count upon reputable intelligence 
organizations equally interested in preventing a terrorist 
attack.  The challenge will relate to the need for coordination 
and exchanges well before the actual Games.  A related 
challenge will be the usual reluctance of intelligence 
organizations (even within the same country) to share 
substantive intelligence.  Therefore, Brazilian intelligence 
organizations should soon begin to coordinate intelligence 
                                                 
20
 See 9-11 Commission Report Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official 
Government Edition:  http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html. 
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with their counterparts – particularly with the Americans, 
Israelis, British, and Germans – and define cooperation 
protocols and exchanges aimed at the Olympic Games. 
 
Preventive policing and security of the premises are also of 
course essential to avoid or to reduce the impacts of a 
terrorist attack during the Olympic Games.  As we have 
seen, the terrorist attack that occurred during the Munich 
games was made easier to execute because of inadequate 
police at the Olympic village.  However, country authorities 
are also reluctant to adopt safety measures that could appear 
to be excessive or draconian.  Indeed, absolute security could 
transform the Olympic village and sports stadiums into 
highly restrictive areas, and this is not what the organizers 
want.  The key is to strike the right balance, and this is a 
challenge whose solution resides in the use of specially 
trained “not-in-uniform” police units.  Again, the 
incorporation of lessons learned from previous Olympic 
Games is essential and puts tremendous pressure on 
Brazilians to closely track the measures and procedures 
adopted at the 2012 London Olympic Games.  
 
Perhaps the most vulnerable component of the 2016 Olympic 
Games will be Rio’s congested urban transportation system, 
even though the original plan for the 2016 Games anticipated 
several changes to the transportation infrastructure.  
Furthermore, preventive measures are also difficult because 
the existing system was not designed with extraordinary 
security concerns in mind.  This was illustrated, for example, 
when on March 12, 2009, a small hijacked plane crashed in a 
shopping center parking lot within the city of Goiania, after 
having flown over the city for approximately 2 hours.  The 
victims were no more than the hijacker himself – who was 
not a terrorist but rather a disturbed man – and his kidnapped 
5-year-old daughter, but it could have been worse.  The 
occurrence effected debate over Brazil’s air space 
vulnerability, since the plane had no flight plan, and was 
considered a threat by Brazilian air defense authorities.  The 
22 
 
Rio Olympics will therefore require specific protocols – 
including military participation – for the likelihood of similar 
circumstances. 
 
Here, practices and protocols developed by the U.S. 
Northern Command and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security in the wake of September 11, 2001 – including 
measures to improve inter-agency relationships and armed 
forces joint responses – could be of exceptional utility for 
Brazilians to consider.
21
  This is an area where U.S. 
cooperation may be particularly welcome.  By the same 
token, information on the protocols and contingency plans 
developed by the U.S. military for pre-deployment in 
anticipation of major public events may also be useful to 
Brazilian authorities.
22
 
 
Finally, should a terrorist attack occur and cause massive 
casualties or a disruption of essential services, Rio de Janeiro 
and its surrounding cities will count upon its emergency 
units and hospitals.  The Civil Defense Secretariat is also 
equipped to prepare for and help in times of major disasters.  
But again, the problem lies within the potentially large-scale 
nature that a disaster wrought by a terrorist attack might 
bring.  For example, the January 2011 flood and mudslide in 
the nearby region of Petropolis – which left a death toll of 
over 600 – demonstrated the fragility of the system to deal 
with major disasters; relief teams could not reach and deliver 
help to several critical areas for days, and the region’s 
hospitals were quickly overwhelmed.  Therefore, another 
option might be to rely upon the preparedness and the 
resources of the military, which in turn must rely upon pre-
deployed emergency kits and ready-to-be-deployed field 
hospitals.  
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 See the Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, 2008-2013: 
“One Team, One Mission, Securing our Homeland,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf. 
22
 See CRS Report:  Homeland Security Roles and Missions for the U.S. 
Northern Command, updated June 3, 2008. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Considering Brazil’s existing security capabilities, and some 
good yet modest improvements in police action, it appears 
that urban crime’s relevant effect upon the Olympic Games 
will be minor.  Moreover, as the federal government did 
prior to and during the 2007 Rio Pan American Games, it 
will again deploy massive forces during the 2016 Games – 
including the use of military – to strengthen local prevention 
and enforcement capabilities.  It has therefore already 
demonstrated a capacity to establish security belts that 
prevent criminals from gaining access to athletes and tourists 
during past major events, while today the government 
continues to implement innovative policies to address 
organized crime and a more centralized urban transportation 
network. 
 
Although Rio and Brazil show thus far no apparent 
connection to terrorist organizations, a terrorist attack during 
2016 Rio Olympic Games cannot be discarded.  Terrorists 
seek targets that allow them to hit their enemies or promote 
their political causes, and large events such as the Olympics 
can of course offer these possibilities.  Furthermore, Rio’s 
Olympic Games could be perceived as an attractive soft 
target because of Brazil’s unfamiliarity with terrorism. 
 
Brazil does have significant governmental forces to prevent 
and respond to a potential terrorist attack, and the 
government has signaled that they will put all of these forces 
into place.  However, there is a clear problem when it comes 
to the country’s lack of familiarity with foreign-based 
terrorist threats, which will require specific preparation, 
training, and cooperation with foreign institutions.  
Additional measures will also be necessary to improve the 
command and control over Brazil’s various agencies prior to 
and during the games, making consultation with more 
experienced actors essential.  For example, elements of the 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD), 
24 
 
sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command, may eventually 
be useful to Brazilians.   The Southern Command has 
developed considerable experience in facing non-
conventional threats and disaster response; experience which 
can be applied to major public event preparation and 
emergency response.  An ACTD program that may be 
particularly interesting to Brazilians is the Counter-
Bomb/Counter-Bomber (CB2) program, which is designed to 
prevent attacks with improvised explosive devices (IED); 
another ACTD goal is to develop capabilities for improving 
joint and interagency relationships, which is also critical for 
Brazilian preparation towards the Olympic Games.
23
 
 
Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian authorities still have a 
long way to go in preparing for the 2016 Olympic Games.  
Some preliminary steps have been adopted, such as the 
creation of an integrated command and control center, but 
this is only the beginning. As similar events happened 
around the world have demonstrated, effective security 
demands long term preparation capable of reassuring an 
efficient inter-agency coordination. For this, organizational 
preparation is needed, and modernization of forces is 
fundamental.  Moreover, security plans must stem from 
realistic considerations about threats that do not respect 
boundaries or neutrality values.  Of paramount importance, 
Brazil must expedite its security preparations for the coming 
Games. 
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 See U.S. Southern Command website: 
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/scienceTech.php. 
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